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ABSTRACT
5e paper critically explores those scenarios (hypothetical, but probable) in 
which armed con2icts take place in outer space. First, the problem regarding 
the de4nition and delimitation of outer space will be analyzed. In this regard, 
the reasons why there is no consensus among the States, and even within the 
scienti4c community, will be explained. Subsequently, the relevant branches 
(for the topic) of Public International Law will be introduced (International 
Space Law, International Humanitarian Law, and Ius ad Bellum) and their key 
regulations will be identi4ed. At this point, the main reasons why Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law shall be applied in the event that an armed con2ict 
develops in outer space will be explained taking into account PIL formal and 
auxiliary sources. Likewise, speci4c challenges, that result from the applica-
tion of International Humanitarian Law in outer space, will be exposed and 
analyzed. 5ese challenges include: (i) attacks on dual-use objects; (ii) the 
obligations of the parties to the con2ict when there is human direct or physi-
cal participation; and (iii) the applicable regulations for the development and 
use of new weapons. For each problem raised, possible solutions based on the 
rules and principles of current law will be provided. Finally, the need for the 
eventual creation of a speci4c treaty to regulate the matter will be emphasized, 
in view of the unique nature of this type of con2ict.
KEYWORDS
International Humanitarian Law; Space Law; Outer Space; applicability; 
challenges; Kármán line; direct participation; new weapons; dual use objects; 
diligence standards 
RESUMEN
El artículo explora de forma crítica aquellos escenarios (hipotéticos, pero probables) 
en los que con!ictos armados se desarrollan en el espacio ultraterrestre. En primer 
lugar, se analizará el problema relativo a la de"nición y delimitación del espacio 
ultraterrestre. Al respecto, se expondrán las razones por las que no existe un con-
senso entre los Estados e, inclusive, dentro de la comunidad cientí"ca. Posterior-
mente, se introducirán las ramas del Derecho Internacional Público relevantes en 
la materia (Derecho Internacional Espacial, Derecho Internacional Humanitario 
y Ius ad Bellum) y se identi"carán normas clave. En este punto, se expondrán las 
principales razones, basadas en fuentes formales y auxiliares del DIP, por las que el 
Derecho Internacional Humanitario debe ser aplicado en caso de que un con!icto 
armado se desarrollase en el espacio ultraterrestre. De igual manera, se expondrán 
y analizarán retos concretos que la aplicación del DIH en el espacio ultraterrestre 
podría suponer en relación con la posibilidad de: (i) ataques a objetos de uso dual; 
(ii) las obligaciones de las partes del con!icto cuando existe participación huma-
na directa o física en el espacio; y, (iii) las normas aplicables para el desarrollo y 
uso de armas nuevas. Para cada problema planteado se proporcionarán posibles 
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soluciones basadas las normas y principios del derecho existente. Finalmente, se en-
fatizará en la necesidad de la eventual creación de un tratado especí"co que regule 
la materia, en vista de la naturaleza única de este tipo de con!ictos. 
PALABRAS CLAVE
Derecho Internacional Humanitario; Derecho Internacional Espacial; espacio 
ultraterrestre; aplicabilidad; retos; línea Kármán; participación directa; nuevas 
armas; objetos de uso dual; estándares de diligencia
1. INTRODUCTION
“All armies prefer high ground to low and sunny places to dark.”
Sun Tzu. 5e Art of War, Chapter IX, 11. 
5e classic 4lms of the 20th century, such as Star Wars and Star Trek, do not 
seem like entire science 4ction anymore. In fact, the space programs of the 
U.S., China, Russia, among others, have developed to the point that space-
ships are a reality and space warfare is plausible nowadays. For instance, in 
2012, the U.S. launched a military space plane known as the X-37B; the 
plane spent 674 days in outer space and was part of a joint project between 
NASA and the Defense Department of the U.S.1. Since the return of the air-
craft in 2014, there have been many speculations about the real purpose of the 
X-37B; despite the fact that most of the information remains classi4ed, the 
experts agree that the test contributed to the development of critical technol-
ogies related with the eventual weaponization of the outer space2. It is remark-
able that the U.S. has expressed how important they consider space warfare 
since the beginning of the Cold War. For example, in 2005 General Lance 
Lord3 proclaimed: “Space superiority is the future of warfare. We cannot win 
a war without controlling the high ground, and the high ground is space”4. 
In the same context, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency considers that Chi-
na and Russia could represent threats due to their technological capacity, and 
their view of the space as “important to the modern warfare”5. Indeed, China 
has stated: “To explore the vast cosmos, develop the space industry, and build 
1 Ghoshroy, Subrata. “5e X-37B: Backdoor weaponization of space?”. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Vol 71:3 (2015), p. 21. 
2 Id., p. 19.
3 According to the U.S. Air Force, General Lance Lord (who retired in 2006) was responsible for the “development, acqui-
sition and operation of the Air Force’s space and missile systems”. Additionally, Lord ensured the “combat readiness of 
America’s intercontinental ballistic missile force”. See more at: U.S. Air Force. General Lace. W. Lord, 2006. 
 https://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/Article/105049/general-lance-w-lord/ (access: 03/01/2020). 
4 General Lord, Lance W. “Space Superiority”. High Frontier. #e Journal for Space and Missile Professionals. Volume 1, Num-
ber 3 (Winter 2005), p. 4.
5 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Challenges to Security in Space, 2019, p. 3. 
 https://fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/dia-challenges.pdf (access: 07/01/2020).
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China into a space power is a dream we pursue unremittingly” (emphasis 
added)6. China’s military capacity in outer space includes 4 communication 
satellites destined for military purposes7, projects involving laser weapons that 
could destroy or damage satellites8, a variated range of space launch vehicles 
(primarily the LM series)9, etc. In fact, in 2007, China tested a direct-ascent 
Anti-satellite weapon (hereinafter ASAT) that destroyed one of their weather 
satellites and demonstrated that space weapons are already at their disposal10. 
In the case of Russia, the facts are very similar; the Russian arsenal includes a 
wide range of space launch vehicles (including the Soyuz and Zenit series)11, 
ASAT laser weapons, mobile missile systems capable to destroy pace targets, 
etc.12 Despite of the fact that the number of States that count with strong 
military space programs is limited, countries such as Iran, North Korea, South 
Korea and Israel have demonstrated certain military capacities that could pro-
duce an impact in space warfare. In consequence, the aforementioned States 
shall be considered probable actors in a hypothetical armed con2ict in outer 
space13. 
5e facts demonstrate that the weaponization of the space is a reality that 
cannot be omitted. Just as the arms race of the end of the 19th century and 
the beginning of the 20th century brought as a consequence the Great War, 
it would not be naïve to think about a real possibility of facing armed con-
2icts in outer space. In that case, it would be inconceivable to think that 
the hostilities could develop without any regulation in this scenario. Conse-
quently, many questions arise regarding the law applicable to armed con2icts 
that could take place in outer space. Even though International Space Law, 
in complement with International Humanitarian Law (onwards IHL), seem 
to be the appropriate branches of law to regulate these situations, there is a 
gigantic gray area. As will be demonstrated, the application of IHL in outer 
space would represent a lot of challenges that would be very di3cult to face 
with the current state of development of law. 
5is article will explore this concern starting from very basic concepts such 
as Outer Space and its possible delimitation, Space Law, and International 
6 5e State Council of the People’s Republic Of China. Full text of white paper on China’s space activities in 2016, 2016. 
 http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_281475527159496.htm (access: 07/01/2020).
7 Union of Concerned Scientists. Satellite Database, 2005-2019. 
 https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database (access: 12/01/2020).
8 Ying, Li; Bingyu, Zhou. “Ground High Power Laser Anti-Satellite Reconnaissance Technology,” Guangdian Duikang yu 
Wuyuan Ganrao [Optoelectronic Warfare and Passive Jamming], No. 2 (2002), pp. 9–12. 
9 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Challenges to Security in Space, 2019, p. 16. 
 https://fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/dia-challenges.pdf (access: 07/01/2020).
10 Foust, Je6. U.S. Dismisses Space Weapons Treaty Proposal As “Fundamentally Flawed”, 2014. 
 https://spacenews.com/41842us-dismisses-space-weapons-treaty-proposal-as-fundamentally-2awed/ (access: 19/01/2020). 
11 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Challenges to Security in Space, 2019, p. 25. 
 https://fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/dia-challenges.pdf (access: 07/01/2020).
12 Id., p. 29.
13 5e weapons referred by each country are mere examples of their military capacity and are not by any mean exhaustive. 5e 
objective of their employment in this introductory section is just to contextualize the current global weaponized scenario. 
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Humanitarian Law. Later, the legal framework applicable to the scenario of 
the armed con2icts in outer space will be analyzed. 5en, some challenges of 
the possible application of IHL will be addressed, including concerns about 
dual-use objects, human direct participation, and the development of new 
weapons. Finally, the necessity of a new treaty will be considered, as well as 




It is fundamental to determine the territorial or physical scope of application 
of the di6erent law frames that will be analyzed in this paper. 5erefore, outer 
space must be conceptualized. An ordinary de4nition of outer space might be: 
“the area outside the earth’s atmosphere where the other planets and stars are 
situated”15. As can be concluded by the simple lecture of the provided de4ni-
tion, the conventional concept may be considered vague and insu3cient as it 
does not include precise limits of outer space. 
Unfortunately, this term is not expressly delimited or delineated by treaty law. 
Furthermore, there is not even agreement within the scienti4c community. 
However, the most common reference used to determine the commencement 
of space is known as the Kármán Line, an imaginary boundary situated 100 
kilometers (62 miles) above sea level16. 5is measure is used by the Fédération 
Aéronautique Internationale (FAI) and many other organizations17. 5e expla-
nation of delimiting space with the Kármán Line is:
In theory, once this 100 km line is crossed, the atmosphere becomes too thin to 
provide enough lift for conventional aircraft to maintain 2ight. At this alti-
tude, a conventional plane would need to reach orbital velocity or risk falling 
back to Earth18. 
14 5is article focuses on scenarios of International Armed Con2icts (IACs). 5e challenges that may arise in regard to 
Non-International Armed Con2icts (NIACs) are very di6erent not only because of the nature of the con2ict but also due 
to the applicable law available. 5erefore, space warfare in NIACs is not going to be addressed with profundity; it may be 
a topic for a future investigation.
15 COBUILD Advanced English Dictionary. Outer Space, N.d. https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/out-
er-space (access: 13/03/2020). 5e term “outer space” started to be used in its current sense since the 1800s. Statistics reveal 
that the term became extremely common during the second half of the 20th century (at the time when the Cold War took 
place); the peak of frequency of the term “outer space” is situated in 1984 and 1987 with records of frequency of 0.42 and 
0.43 respectively. To see more visit the previously cited site. 
16 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Space. It’s the "nal frontier and also happens to be where NOAA operates 
the Nation’s environmental and meteorological satellites. But where is “space” exactly, 2016, par. 5. 
 https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/content/where-space (access: 24/01/2020).
17 Ibíd.
18 Id., par. 4.
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Beyond theoretical discussions, States have adopted functional approaches 
considering aerodynamic parameters19. In this context, for the United States: 
“terrestrial-based forces generally operate below an altitude of roughly 100 
kilometers, whereas spaced-based forces operate above this altitude where the 
e6ects of drag and lift are negligible”20. In the case of the United Kingdom, 
the beginning of outer space is not that clear because it would depend on the 
technology available. Indeed, the U.K. maintains that the extent of the air-
space may vary, but for practical purposes: “the upper limit to a state’s rights 
in airspace is above the highest altitude at which an aircraft can 2y and below 
the lowest possible perigee of an earth satellite in orbit”21. 
5e aim to reach a consensus between the international community regard-
ing the de4nition and delimitation of the outer space has been present since 
1966 via the Legal Subcommittee (hereinafter Legal Subcommittee) of the 
UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space22. 5e reality is that this 
organ has not been able to reach an agreement in more than 50 years. In such 
a long time, the debate within the Subcommittee has focused on technical 
and scienti4c endless discussions. Furthermore, at some point between 1979 
and 1982, the debate took a drastic turn in order to discuss the necessity of 
developing a de4nition and delimitation of outer space23. 5e fact that the 
institutions have not been able to properly address this issue, plus the lack of 
will of the States, leads us to the conclusion that the goal to de4ne and delimit 
outer space in a binding instrument is far to be materialized. 
At this point, the following question would normally arise: Is it a matter of 
such great importance to delimit outer space in a binding instrument? 5e 
answer is undoubtedly a3rmative. Some of the reasons have been provided by 
those States that participated in the 4fty-eight session of the Legal Subcom-
mittee in 2019; in summary, the delimitation of outer space would: 
a. Reduce uncertainty regarding the applicability of space law and aeronautical 
law.
b. Facilitate the national implementation of international space and aeronauti-
cal law. 
19 Schmitt, Michael N. “International Law and Operations in Space”. Max Planck Yearbook of the United Nations Law. Volume 
10 (2006), p. 99.
20 United States Air Force. Space Operations, Doctrine Document 2-2, 2001, pp. 33-34. 
 http://usafaspace.tripod.com/other/AFDD_2_2_11_01.pdf (access: 27/01/2020).
21 5e Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Con2ict (2004). UK Ministry of Defense. Article 12.13. 
22 In 1966, the delegation of France requested the General Assembly of the UN to incorporate the question relative to the de4-
nition and delimitation of the outer space to the agenda of the Legal Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space. Additionally, the General Assembly, in its resolution 38/80 of December 15th of 1983, disposed the 
Legal Subcommittee the creation of a working group in order to treat this topic as a priority. See more at: United Nations 
General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee. Historical summary on the con-
sideration of the question on the de"nition and delimitation of outer space: Report of the Secretariat, A/AC.105/769 (2002). 
https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_769E.pdf
23 United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee. Historical 
summary on the consideration of the question on the de"nition and delimitation of outer space: Report of the Secretariat, A/
AC.105/769 (2002), par. 10-12. https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_769E.pdf
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c. Provide clarity to States and non-state actors in activities such as the position-
ing of satellites and suborbital 2ights. 
d. Enable the enforcement of law, rules and regulations [may International Hu-
manitarian Law be included]24. 
In case a new binding instrument is created to regulate armed con2icts in 
outer space, the 4rst point to solve would be its delimitation. It would not 
be substantial to reach a unanimous agreement about the scienti4c delinea-
tion of space; hence, the States could establish this limit guided by practical, 
technological, or even referential considerations. In this context, the Kármán 
Line could represent an adequate answer to this matter25. Until treaty law is 
created, the lack of regulation produces uncertainty as there is an enormous 
gray area in International Public Law regarding this topic. Consequently, it 
would represent a real challenge to any court to determine where outer space 
commences. Moreover, as there is no consensus between the States and the 
scienti4c community, neither in theory nor in practice, it would be impossi-
ble to determine the existence of customary norms.
2.2. SPACE LAW
5e United Nations O3ce for Outer Space A6airs (hereinafter UNOOSA) 
de4nes Space Law as “the body of law governing space-related activities”26. 
5e de4nition provided by the UNOOSA is considerably wide, so it could be 
interpreted that Space Law not only regulates those activities that physically 
occur in the space but also those that are related to space activities in general. 
5at interpretation is fundamental in order to frame certain activities that 
take place on Earth and could represent violations to Space Law such as the 
development of weapons of mass destruction meant to be put in orbit. 
Space Law comprises instruments of International Public Law and internal 
norms of each State’s legislation. In particular, International Space Law (here-
inafter ISL) has been developing since half a century ago. 5e United Na-
tions Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (hereinafter COPUOS) 
played a protagonist role in the early years of ISL. In fact, the COPUOS, 
24 United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee. Report of the 
Legal Subcommittee on its "fty-eighth session, held in Vienna from 1 to 12 April 2019, A/AC.105/1203 (2019), par. 88-92. 
https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_769E.pdf
25 In the same report of the Legal Subcommittee of 2019, some States proposed a similar solution that is contained in para-
graph 91: “5e view was expressed that the rationale for a delimitation of outer space and airspace at between 100 and 110 
km above sea level was based on comprehensive considerations including scienti4c, technical and physical characteristics, 
namely the atmospheric layers, aircraft altitude capacity, the perigee of the spacecraft and the Karman line” (emphasis 
added). 
26 United Nations O3ce for Outer Space A6airs. Space Law, n.d.  
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/index.html (access: 07/02/2020).
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along with its 67 State members, developed 4ve core space law treaties that 
are known as the corpus iuris spatialis27, which includes:
1. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(hereinafter Outer Space Treaty)28.
2. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the 
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space29.
3. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects30.
4. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space31.
5. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies32.
5ere are also 4ve declarations of principles that were adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. Because of their nature, these instruments 
are soft law sources and, therefore, not binding. However, the aforementioned 
declarations are relevant as they regulate speci4c topics that are extremely rele-
vant to space warfare such as the uses of satellites. 5ese instruments include:
1. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Uses of Outer Space33.
2. 5e Principles Governing the Use by States of Arti4cial Earth Satellites 
for International Direct Television Broadcasting34.
3. 5e Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space35.
4. 5e Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer 
Space36.
27 Schmitt, Michael N. “International Law and Operations in Space”. Max Planck Yearbook of the United Nations Law. Volume 
10 (2006), p. 100.
28 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 2222 (XXI), opened for signature on 27 January 1967, entered into 
force on 10 October 1967.
29 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 2345 (XXII), opened for signature on 22 April 1968, entered into 
force on 3 December 1968.
30 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 2777 (XXVI), opened for signature on 29 March 1972, entered into 
force on 1 September 1972.
31 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 3235 (XXIX), opened for signature on 14 January 1975, entered 
into force on 15 September 1976.
32 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 34/68, opened for signature on 18 December 1979, entered into 
force on 11 July 1984.
33 Approved by the UN General Assembly resolution 1962 (XVIII) of 13 December 1963.
34 Approved by the UN General Assembly resolution 37/92 of 10 December 1982.
35 Approved by the UN General Assembly resolution 41/65 of 3 December 1986.
36 Approved by the UN General Assembly resolution 47/68 of 14 December 1992.
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5. 5e Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space for the Bene4t and in the Interest of All States, Taking 
into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries37.
2.3. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
IHL is commonly referred to as the law of war (ius in bello in Latin) or the law 
of the armed con2icts, that is a more appropriate de4nition. IHL has two fun-
damental purposes: to limit the means and methods of war employed during 
hostilities (known as Hague Law) and to protect persons that are not, or not 
anymore, participating in hostilities (known as Geneva Law). Excluding spe-
ci4c rules related to implementation and processes of judgment, IHL has to 
be exclusively applied in armed con2ict scenarios. IHL rules are scattered on 
conventional and customary sources. 
3. APPLICABLE LAW
5e military use of outer space shall be analyzed in two moments or scenarios 
(i) during peacetime; and (ii) during armed con2icts. 
3.1. THE USE OF OUTER SPACE IN PEACETIME
In this 4rst stage, there are not hostilities taking place in outer space yet; 
therefore, there is not an armed con2ict. As has been previously explained, 
IHL would not be applicable in this scenario. On the other hand, Space Law, 
through its treaties, would be in force. 5e main conventional rules regarding 
the military use of outer space may be resumed in: 
1. Article III of the Outer Space Treaty that conditions space activities to the 
observation of International Law and the UN Charter and their peaceful 
purposes38. 5is article recognizes the applicability of the ius ad bellum or 
ius contra bellum regime (including its exceptions) that is detailed in the 
UN Charter. 
2. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, that is considered the most relevant 
norm of International Spac e Law in relation to space warfare. In the 4rst 
place, it prohibits the installation of nuclear weapons and any other kind 
of mass destruction weapons in outer space or celestial bodies. Further-
more, this article declares that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be 
37 Approved by the UN General Assembly resolution 51/122 of 13 December 1996.
38 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies (1967). Article 3.
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used only for peaceful purposes; it is consequently forbidden to establish 
military bases and to test new weapons there39. 
3. Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty which declares that States shall bear 
international responsibility, not only for their o3cial activities in outer 
space but also for the activities of their nationals40.
4. Articles II, III, and IV of the Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects that regulate the responsibility of the 
States to repair, in case of producing damages, as a result of space activi-
ties41. 
5. Article II of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space which prescribes that every space object launched shall be 
registered by the State and informed to the Secretary General of the UN42. 
So, in theory, the outer space shall be used only for peaceful purposes, and 
space activities shall observe International Law. Nevertheless, the following 
question arises: What if the aforementioned rules of International Space Law 
and ius contra bellum are broken and a State starts an armed con2ict? 
3.2. THE USE OF OUTER SPACE IN ARMED CONFLICT SCENARIOS
In the second stage, where hostilities take place and the armed con2ict has 
started, the question arises: Is IHL applicable in outer space? 
It is necessary to make a disclaimer before going deeper into this matter. 5e 
objective of this paper is neither to promote, by any mean, nor to legitimize 
military use of outer space. In fact, the real goal of the paper is to analyze the 
legal frame applicable in case an armed con2ict arises starting from the prem-
ise that it would be inconceivable that such actions could develop without any 
regulation. 5is comment is necessary because some scholars and even States 
consider that analyzing the possible application of IHL in outer space legiti-
mizes this kind of warfare. For example, the Russian Federation has expressed:
At present, the expert community is paying increased attention to the issues of the 
applicability of international humanitarian law to military space activities. Many 
institutions, including the specialized international intergovernmental organiza-
tion of the United Nations system, show an interest in assessing the implications 
39 Eiusdem. Article 4.
40 Eiusdem. Article 6. 5is article is particularly controversial as many interpretations are plausible. It is not clear what would 
happen if non-governmental entities produced damages in outer space without the control and authorization of the State 
or States where they are located.
41 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972). Articles 2-4. 
42 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1976). Article 2. 
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of this branch of international law for space activities. Generally speaking, the 
“popularization” of this topic is quite an ambiguous thing. 5e new research trend 
raises concern because, whichever way one looks at it, it encourages the perception 
that warfare in outer space is accepted as an eventuality43.
 
5e position that the Russian Federation maintains is extremely risky because 
it hinders the possibility that law anticipates possible scenarios where a lot of 
lives could be seriously compromised and even the stability of the internation-
al system could be broken.
Having made these clari4cations, it will be proceeded to analyze the question 
that was already stated regarding the applicability of IHL in outer space. In 
2015 the International Committee of the Red Cross (onwards ICRC), ex-
posed a statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations stating: 
What is certain is that any hostile use of outer space in armed con2ict –that is, 
any use of means and methods of warfare in, from, to or through outer space– 
must comply with IHL, in particular its rules of distinction, proportionality and 
precautions in attack44. 
5e statement is categoric: when armed con2icts take place in outer space, the 
parties must comply with IHL. 5e ICRC emphasized that stating that IHL 
is applicable in outer space does not mean that space can be legally used for 
hostile purposes, because that would imply a violation of International Space 
Law and ius ad bellum. It is also interesting the way the ICRC provides a re-
markably broad de4nition for the hostile use of outer space; in fact, following 
the statement, hostile acts could be conducted in, from, to or through space. 
It is appropriate to remember that the declaration of the ICRC is not legally 
binding if we follow article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice45; however, it can be used as an auxiliary source as it constitutes spe-
cialized doctrine. 
Additionally, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ), have implic-
itly expressed itself in favor of the applicability of IHL in outer space. In fact, 
in its Advisory Opinion of 1996 relative to the Legality of the 5reat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons, the court considered that IHL “applies to all forms of 
warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and 
43 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Survey of the problem of discretion exercised by States in interpreting basic 
legal principles and norms related to safety and security in outer space: Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation. 
A/AC.105/2018/CRP.17 (2018), par. 21. https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2018/aac_1052018crp/
aac_1052018crp_17_0_html/AC105_2018_CRP17E.pdf
44 International Committee of the Red Cross. General debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items. United 
Nations, General Assembly, 70th session, First Committee, statement by the ICRC, New York, 15 October 2015, 2015. 
 https://www.icrc.org/en/document/weapons-icrc-statement-united-nations-2015 (access: 31/01/200).
45 Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945). Article 38.
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those of the future”46. 5ere is no doubt that space warfare would be covered 
in that de4nition. As well as the ICRC’s statement, ICJ’s Advisory Opinion 
constitutes an auxiliary source of International Law. 
At this point, it is necessary to establish binding sources that lead to the same 
conclusion. Perhaps the best argument results from the interpretation of com-
mon article 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which prescribes: “5e 
High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the 
present Convention in all circumstances” (emphasis added)47. 5e phrase 
“all circumstances” includes the territorial or physical scope of application 
of IHL; following this logic, the outer space cannot be excluded from IHL’s 
frame. Dr. Dale Stephens, Editor in Chief of the Manual on International 
Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space (MILAMOS), interprets this 
article stating that it “surely means the law applies wherever and whenever 
armed con2ict occurs”48.
Strong arguments may also be found in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions. In fact, article 1.2. states: 
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civil-
ians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles 
of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of hu-
manity and from the dictates of public conscience49.
 
5is is one of the many variations of the Marten’s Clause. So, following its 
logic, in all scenarios that are not directly covered by the Protocol or even by 
the Geneva Conventions, the basic principles of International Public Law, 
international custom, and the basic principles of IHL shall be applied. 
Another very strong argument, supported by a binding source, comes from 
article 3 of the Outer Space Treaty that conditions space activities to the ob-
servation of International Law50. As International Humanitarian Law is a 
branch of International Law, it is clear that is covered by the scope of article 3. 
In conclusion, there are very strong arguments from both binding and 
non-binding sources of International Public Law that support the possibility 
and necessity to apply IHL in the case and armed con2ict arises in outer 
space.
46 International Court of Justice. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the #reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996, par.86.
47 5e Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1949). Common Article 1.
48 Stephens, Dale. Why Outer Space Matters. Dr. Dale Stephens gives a brief introduction to International Humanitarian Law, 
2016. https://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/twmzia1cp84kv2c29bi4iz6q4u03in (access: 21/01/2020).
49 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Con2icts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977 (1977). Article 1.2.
50 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies (1967). Article 3.
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4. CHALLENGES OF IHL IN OUTER SPACE
A3rming that IHL is largely applicable in outer space does not solve the con-
troversy at all. In fact, it is evident that IHL, as well as other branches of law 
such as Tax Law, Environmental Law, and Property Law, were created to be 
applied on Earth; therefore, many challenges arise.
4.1. DUAL-USE OBJECTS
Attacks directed to dual-use objects represent perhaps the most challenging 
issue of space warfare. Civilian objects are protected under International Hu-
manitarian Law by speci4c conventional and customary rules that gather the 
essence of the principle of Distinction51. However, when those objects come 
to be used for military purposes, they lose that protection and become mil-
itary objectives52. In those situations, such objects are usually known as du-
al-use objects. 5e problem is that the majority of satellites and other space 
objects that could be used for military purposes have also civilian purposes. 
5e ICRC expressed its concern to the United Nations about the alarming 
possible consequences of attacking space dual-use objects; indicating:
Attacks against such highly integrated “dual-use” systems through kinetic or 
non-kinetic means can entail signi4cant humanitarian consequences for up to 
millions of civilians on the ground, for example by disrupting health-care and 
other essential services that depend on space-based communication systems53.
About this topic, the Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical 
Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space conducted a 
study relative to the potential consequences of space warfare. 5e results were 
exposed in an inform called: Humanitarian Consequences and Constraints 
Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) related to the Potential Use 
of Weapons in Outer Space. Among others, the most relevant consequences 
are54:
1. 5e destruction of communication systems.
2. Damages to health systems on Earth.
51 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Con2icts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977 (1977). Article 52.
52 ICRC Customary IHL Database. Rule 10. 
53 International Committee of the Red Cross. General debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items. United 
Nations, General Assembly, 70th session, First Committee, statement by the ICRC, New York, 15 October 2015, 2015. 
 https://www.icrc.org/en/document/weapons-icrc-statement-united-nations-2015 (access: 31/01/200).
54 Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Hu-
manitarian Consequences and Constraints Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) related to the Potential Use of Weap-
ons in Outer Space: Working paper submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), GE-PAROS/2019/WP.1 
(2019), par. 3.
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3. Disaster prevention and mitigation would be a6ected if satellites are dam-
aged. 
4. Navigation systems would be damaged.
In these cases, the principle of proportionality must be observed. 5is prin-
ciple is gathered in treaties such as the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions as well as customary law. Rule 14 of the ICRC’s Customary IHL 
Database prescribes:
Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated, is prohibited55.
In fact, the principle of proportionality implies the duty of the attacking party 
to contrast civilian losses with the military advantage in every single attack. 
5is principle is intimately related to the principle of military necessity; fur-
thermore, attacks can be made only if the party pretends to obtain a direct 
and concrete military advantage from the attack. 
5ere is a speci4c case where IHL regulates and establishes a higher standard 
of military necessity in order to protect cultural objects that could be used to 
establish an analogy in this case. 5at is the case of the Hague Convention of 
1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con2ict 
that, in its article 4.2, prescribes that imperative military necessity is required 
in order to exceptionally attack the objects protected by the convention56. It 
is obvious that the Hague Convention establishes high standards in order to 
protect cultural objects because their damage would produce bigger conse-
quences for humanity compared to the destruction of a common object. As 
the standard of imperative military necessity of the 1954 Hague Convention 
resulted ambiguous, its scope was clari4ed in article 6 of the Second Addition-
al Protocol of 1999 which established a list of requisites in order to lawfully 
invoke imperative military necessity. Article 6 mandates: 
With the goal of ensuring respect for cultural property in accordance with Article 
4 of the Convention:
(a) a waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity pursuant to Article 4 
paragraph 2 of the Convention may only be invoked to direct an act of hostility 
against cultural property when and for as long as:(i) that cultural property has, 
by its function, been made into a military objective; and (ii) there is no feasible 
alternative available to obtain a similar military advantage to that o!ered by 
directing an act of hostility against that objective;
55 ICRC Customary IHL Database. Rule 14. 
56 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con2ict (1954). Article 4.
Armed Conflicts in Outer Space: Applicability and Challenges of International...
USFQ Law Review • Vol. VII • sept. 2020 • 349
(b) a waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity pursuant to Article 4 
paragraph 2 of the Convention may only be invoked to use cultural property for 
purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage when and for as 
long as no choice is possible between such use of the cultural property and another 
feasible method for obtaining a similar military advantage;
(c) the decision to invoke imperative military necessity shall only be taken by an 
o3cer commanding a force the equivalent of a battalion in size or larger, or a force 
smaller in size where circumstances do not permit otherwise;
(d) in case of an attack based on a decision taken in accordance with sub-para-
graph (a), an e6ective advance warning shall be given whenever circumstances 
permit (emphasis added)57.
As it can be noticed, the standard of imperative military necessity is very high. 
In the 4rst place, it may be invoked just if there is not any other feasible way 
to obtain a similar military advantage; this means that the attack must be the 
last resource. Additionally, the article establishes requisites such as the need 
for a direct order from an o3cer that commands the force and the practice of 
an e6ective warning before the attack. 
In case a new treaty is developed, the standard of imperative military necessity 
should be considered for any attack directed to space objects that are particu-
larly vulnerable such as satellites. As it would be very di3cult for the attacking 
party to determine the total civilian damage that could result from the attack 
to a satellite, the higher possible standard should be enforced. 
4.2. HUMAN DIRECT PARTICIPATION 
Space warfare can develop with or without direct or physical human partic-
ipation in outer space. 5ose scenarios where humans directly participate in 
military operations in space suppose a real challenge to International Law. 
IHL counts with numerous provisions in order to regulate the treatment of 
prisoners of war and detainees, the treatment that shall be given to the corps-
es, the rights of the wounded to receive medical assistance, etc. Of course, 
these rules would be extremely di3cult to observe if the armed con2ict takes 
place in outer space; as a matter of fact, not only economic but also physical 
factors would prevent the parties to properly ful4ll their obligations. 
5e regime applicable to the treatment of prisoners of war is principally gath-
ered in the 5ird Geneva Convention. 5e parties, regarding their obligations 
with prisoners of war, have the duty to safely evacuate them58, maintain them 
57 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con2ict 
(1999). Article 6.
58 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 (1949). Article 20. 
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far from zones exposed to military combat59, assure their basic needs60, let the 
prisoners receive shipments61, etc. It is necessary to consider that it is unlikely 
that States could send crews capable of satisfying all the requirements of pris-
oners in outer space. Additionally, in space transports, there surely will not 
be enough space to maintain prisoners for a long time. Finally, it would be 
impossible to maintain them far from the combat zones.
Additional Protocol I and Customary Law state that the parties have the ob-
ligation to search for the persons that are reported missing in the context 
of armed con2ict62. It would be inconceivable to pretend that a party could 
conduct a proper search in outer space. 5e parties have also the obligation 
to search and collect the remains of the dead taking all possible measures63. 
5ere are also many obligations in IHL regarding the treatment of the corpses 
and the celebration of proper burials taking all possible measures64. As we can 
see, these obligations have to be met considering a diligence standard and the 
resources available. It is evident that the obligations related to the treatment 
of prisoners of war, the missing and the dead, are much complicated to ob-
serve when armed con2icts develop in outer space. 5erefore, the standard of 
diligence required from the belligerent party shall be far less strict. However, 
if that standard is accepted, it would imply that sending humans to combat 
in outer space should be an exceptional measure because those combatants 
would be really vulnerable in such scenarios. 
Let us try to imagine a hypothetical scenario where soldiers are sent to outer space 
in the context of armed con2ict. In 2180, the United Kingdom accidentally de-
stroys a Chinese military satellite during a training session of the “Royal British 
Space Army”. 5e satellite falls to Earth and the U.S. intelligent services collect 
the pieces and process all the national security information that they could gather. 
China considers the U.K.’s actions as acts of war. 5erefore, China sends a mili-
tary spaceship to outer space, with 70 soldiers and 9 crew members, in order to 
protect other Chinese satellites and manually disable satellites from the U.K. and 
the U.S. as a reprisal. Dismayed by the measures taken by China, the U.S. send 
their own spaceship to outer space, with 50 soldiers, and place it very close to the 
Chinese spacecraft. Tensions rise to the point that the U.S. crew decides to attack 
the Chinese ship with a laser weapon. Because of the attack, the Chinese ship 
su6ers severe damage, 20 soldiers, as well as all crew members, die, and 40 other 
soldiers get seriously injured. 
59 Eiusdem. Article 22.
60 Eiusdem. Articles 15 and 30.
61 Eiusdem. Article 72.
62 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Con2icts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977 (1977). Article 33. See also: ICRC Customary IHL Database. Rule 117.
63 See Geneva Convention I, Art. 15(1); GC II, Art. 18(1); GC IV, Art. 16(2); ICRC Customary IHL Database, Rule 112. 
Additional Protocol I, Art. 33(4).
64 See Geneva Convention I, Art. 17; GC II, Art. 20; GC III, Art. 120(3)-(5); GC IV, Art. 130(1) and (2); ICRC Customary 
IHL Database, Rule 115.
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After the attack, the U.S. sends a reconnaissance mission to the spaceship 
from China. Because of the capacity of the ship, U.S. soldiers were just able 
to capture 10 prisoners of war and to transport 10 wounded to the U.S. ship 
in order to provide medical treatment. It is evident that the U.S. would not be 
able to transport all the prisoners and the wounded to a safe place in case the 
con2ict continues. It is also clear that the corpses would not be transported 
and properly buried. Furthermore, perhaps even basic needs would not be 
provided to the prisoners and the wounded would not receive appropriate 
medical treatment because of the lack of available resources. Finally, maybe 
a lot of survivors would have to be abandoned because of the lack of physi-
cal space on the ship. As it could be seen, very complicated situations could 
arise if humans directly take place in hostilities that take place in outer space. 
In such cases, States would be obligated to comply with their international 
obligations, depending on available resources, taking all possible measures. 
However, it is clear that such obligations would never be enough; therefore, 
human direct participation in armed con2icts that take place in outer space 
should be extremely restricted. 
4.3. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prescribes: “5e establishment of military 
bases, installations and forti4cations, the testing of any type of weapons and 
the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden”65. 
Although the article prohibits the testing of new weapons in celestial bodies, 
there is not an express prohibition to test or develop new weapons in orbit, 
inside a space station, or any other space object. 5e same article prohibits the 
use of nuclear weapons and any other kind of mass destruction weapons in 
outer space, making it clear that they cannot be used in outer space.
For the rest of the weapons that could be developed in outer space, there is 
not a concrete answer. 5is is a gray area of IHL and generates an enormous 
debate nowadays. What is clear is that the same standards and rules applicable 
on Earth shall be applied in space. In this sense, Article 36 of Additional Pro-
tocol I to the Geneva Conventions states66:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or 
method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by 
[…] international law.
65 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 2222 (XXI), opened for signature on 27 January 1967, entered into 
force on 10 October 1967.
66 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Con2icts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977 (1977). Article 36.
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5erefore, the parties to an armed con2ict have the obligation to determine if 
the weapons that are being developed and may be used in the con2ict would 
not contradict the rules and principles of IHL. Niles Melzer established a test 
in order to determine if a new weapon would be allowed by IHL. 5e test is 
constituted by 4 main points considering if the weapon: 
1. would already be prohibited under a speci4c weapon treaty;
2. would constitute an indiscriminate weapon;
3. would be of a nature to cause super2uous injury or unnecessary su6ering, or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment;
4. would contradict the “principles of humanity” or “public conscience” (Mar-
tens Clause)67. 
5e test of Melzer considers the observance of conventional law, the principle 
of distinction, the principle of humanity, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military 
or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modi4cation Techniques (EN-
MOD) regulations regarding attacks to the natural environment and, 4nal-
ly68, Marten’s Clause. 
5e International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of 
the 5reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons of 1996 analyzed the case of nuclear 
weapons and expressed its view about the development of new weapons in 
general. 5e court stated that Marten’s Clause “had proved to be an e6ective 
mean of addressing the rapid evolution of military technology”69. In this Advi-
sory Opinion, the ICJ analyzed the legality of nuclear weapons applying IHL 
principles of distinction and humanity. 5e Court determined that, although 
Nuclear Weapons are not conventionally prohibited, it would be extremely 
complicated that an attack employing them could ful4ll IHL principles. 5e 
same standards should be observed when a new space weapon is developed.
5. THE PATH TO A TREATY
Along the paper, many solutions have been proposed in order to regulate an 
hypothetical armed con2ict in outer space. 5ose solutions have been mainly 
directed to the application of treaties, customary rules, and principles that 
already exist and are applied on Earth. However, as space warfare is unique 
67 Melzer, Nils. International Humanitarian Law: a Comprehensive Introduction. Geneva: International Committee of the Red 
Cross, 2016, p. 122.
68 Article 35.3. of Additional Protocol I prescribes: “It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intend-
ed, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment”. By the other hand, 
Article 1 of the ENMOD Convention prescribes: “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military 
or any other hostile use of environmental modi4cation techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe e6ects as the 
means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party”. As can be noticed, ENMOD provides broader protection 
to the natural environment as just one of the requisites is required. It is not clear if these dispositions in regard to the natural 
environment could be applied for outer space. 
69 International Court of Justice. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the #reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996, par. 78.
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because of its nature, a lot of IHL rules result inapplicable or insu3cient. 
5e most e6ective solution to e6ectively regulate armed con2icts in outer 
space would require the creation of a speci4c treaty. However, currently, there 
is not a consensus between States in regard to many relevant topics such as 
the delimitation of outer space. 5erefore, it would be prudent to consider 
that perhaps the best option at the moment would be to focus on develop-
ing non-binding instruments that could provide guidelines and principles. 
It would be expected that, with the passage of time, greater consensus could 
be achieved by States and then, and only then, the idea of a treaty would be 
generally accepted and, consequently the creation of a binding instrument 
would be viable. 
5is strategy has already been applied in several cases framed in the 4eld of 
IHL. For example, by the initiative of Switzerland and the ICRC, in Septem-
ber of 2008 5e Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obli-
gations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military 
and Security Companies during Armed Con2ict was originally approved by 
just 17 States70. However, that number is continually growing. Likewise, in 
2013 the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber War-
fare was published. Both instruments cited are not binding but they serve as 
a useful source because they provide solutions and interpretation for two gray 
areas of IHL as cyberwarfare and private contractors. 
In the 4th Manfred Lachs Conference on Con2icts in Space and the Rule of 
Law, the project to create the Manual on International Law Applicable to Mil-
itary Uses of Outer Space (hereinafter MILAMOS) was launched by McGill 
University (Canada) and University of Adelaide (Australia)71. 5e project is 
also supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross and States 
like Canada72. 5e project pretends to: “draft a widely-accepted manual clar-
ifying the rules applicable to the military use of outer space”73. 5e Manual 
will be divided into two parts: A and B. Part A will focus on military uses 
of space in a global security context that is relatively benign. On the other 
hand, part B will focus on military uses of space in situations posing threat 
to the peace, and the legal characterization of coercive or overtly hostile ac-
tivities (use of force, jus ad bellum)74. MILAMOS project has created many 
expectations because it is being developed by remarkable experts in the 4eld. 
Additionally, it seems like MILAMOS will be a very detailed instrument as it 
will cover a wide range of rules including: 
70 5e Montreux Document On pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations 
of private military and security companies during armed con2ict (2009).




74 McGill University. Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space, Research, n.d.  
https://www.mcgill.ca/milamos/research (access: 09/04/2020).
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PART A
Delimitation UN Registration
Applicability of International Law Jurisdiction and Control
Harmful Interference under Article IX 
of the Outer Space Treaty
Cooperation, Mutual Assistance and Due 
Regard
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Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum Rescue and Return
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Launching States Military Maneuvers, Military Bases and 
Military Installations




Freedom of Use Property Rights
Application of Domestic Laws Space Operations
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Weapons of Mass Destruction National Space Activities
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national Organizations
PART B
Harmful Interference and Intervention Right of Self-Defense Against Armed At-
tack
Prohibition of 5reat or Use of Force
5reat of Use of Force
Use of Force
Use of Force less than Armed Attack
Countermeasures






75 Author’s own graphic. Based on: McGill University. Research, n.d. https://www.mcgill.ca/milamos/research (access: 
09/04/2020).
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MILAMOS project may represent the 4rst big step in order to regulate armed 
con2icts in outer space. As shown in the graphic, most of the topics that were 
addressed in the paper will be covered in the Manual including: space objects, 
delimitation, rescue and return operations, the status of astronauts, the appli-
cability of IPL and IHL, etc. One of the weaknesses that could be identi4ed 
in the Manual by just looking at its subtitles has to do with the fact that very 
controversial topics such as R2P will be covered. Indeed, covering this kind of 
issue could produce negative consequences such as the delegitimization of the 
project and the lack of cooperation from several States. It would be ideal if, 
with the basis of initiatives like MILAMOS project, the topic became popular 
on the international scene with a view to developing a binding treaty in the 
future. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
5roughout the paper, some of the most concerning issues in relation to the 
possibility of applying the rules and principles of International Humanitarian 
Law, in the event that an armed con2ict develops in outer space, have been 
exposed and analyzed.
5e 4rst critical problem is related to the lack of consensus among States, and 
even within the scienti4c community, in regard to the de4nition and delim-
itation of outer space. Although the aim to reach a consensus between the 
international community has been present in the debates of the competent 
organs of the United Nations (including the General Assembly and the Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space) since 1966, the progress that 
has been reached so far is very limited. 5e problem is that States use di6er-
ent approaches to determine the beginning of outer space based on scienti4c 
theoretical concepts, aerodynamic approaches, and even numbers based on 
their convenience. Perhaps the most feasible solution for this problem would 
be the consideration of the Kármán line as a unique standard. However, it is 
clear that everything depends on the goodwill of the States in order to reach a 
consensus and establish a uniform standard. 
5e key legal problem addressed by the paper tried to answer whether IHL 
would be applicable in outer space. 5e paper established two approaches: a 
theoretical or legal approach and a practical or empirical approach. 5e the-
oretical approach pretended to 4nd legal arguments to support the thesis in 
favor of the applicability of IHL in outer space. Both binding and auxiliary 
sources of Public International Law were presented. 5e most relevant bind-
ing norms, that may lead to obtaining a favorable answer, are common article 
1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, article 1.2 of the Additional Protocol 
I (and other expressions of the Martens Clause), and article 3 of the Outer 
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Space Treaty. Auxiliary sources, such as doctrinarian statements of the ICRC 
and advisory opinions of the ICJ, also support the same conclusions. Based on 
the arguments presented, it could be concluded that the existing legal frame is 
enough to a3rm that IHL would be e6ectively applicable if an armed con2ict 
developed in outer space.
However, a3rming that IHL is theoretically or legally applicable is not 
enough in the sense that space warfare, because of its very unique nature, 
would present very challenging scenarios. 5e paper focuses on three of the 
most concerning gray areas —resulting from the application of IHL in outer 
space— including: (i) attacks on dual-use objects; (ii) the obligations of the 
parties to the con2ict when there is human direct or physical participation; 
and (iii) the applicable regulations for the development and use of new weap-
ons. 5e analysis of such situations gave as a result one general conclusion 
(applicable to the three cases) and some speci4c considerations. 5e general 
conclusion focuses on the need for a new speci4c treaty that regulates the area. 
On the 4rst challenge, regarding the possibility of attacks directed at dual-use 
objects such as satellites, the importance of the principles of distinction and 
proportionality was considered. Additionally, the need to implement the im-
perative military necessity standard, that is used for the protection of cultural 
objects, or a similar regime was considered. On the second challenge, regard-
ing the obligations of the States when there is direct human participation 
in hostilities, the main conclusion proposed that the standard of diligence 
required from the belligerent party shall be far less strict at the moment of 
obligations related with the treatment of the wounded, the management of 
corpses, etc. Finally, on the third challenge, regarding the development or use 
of new weapons, the general conclusion is that the same rules, principles, and 
considerations that are applied on Earth shall be considered in outer space. 
Finally, the paper analyzed the possibility to create a new treaty that would 
speci4cally regulate space warfare. 5e general conclusion is categoric: as space 
warfare is unique because of its nature, plenty of IHL rules result inapplicable 
or insu3cient. 5erefore, a speci4c treaty is necessary in order to e6ectively 
ful4ll the existing gaps. However, currently, there is not a consensus between 
States in regard to many relevant topics such as the delimitation of outer 
space so it would be prudent to create non-binding instruments, that may 
contain general guidelines or principles, in a 4rst stage. In this context, the 
MILAMOS project was recognized as an interesting and remarkable 4rst step 
in order to create a non-binding instrument that, with the passage of time, 
could contain rules and principles that may be considered in a new treaty in 
the future. 
Frequently, the law arrives late. 5is means that law is codi4ed or developed 
when a disaster or a con2ict has already happened, and regrettable conse-
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quences have to be faced. 5erefore, it is a duty of the academy to start asking 
questions framed in hypothetical but probable scenarios with the aim to pre-
vent its occurrence. 5e paper did not intend to legitimize the occurrence of 
armed con2icts in outer space but to provide possible solutions in case that 
one arises.
